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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LIABILITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS ACTING UNDER
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTES
Smith v. Costello, 77 Idaho 205, 290 P.2d 742 (1955)
Two plaintiffs brought separate actions for damages against
defendant for shooting their dogs. Defendant answered that he
was an authorized conservation officer, that the dogs were running
at large in territory inhabited by deer, and that he was authorized
by statute' to shoot the dogs. The trial court held that defendant's
plea constituted no defense because the statute was unconstitutional,
and entered judgments for plaintiffs. On appeal, HELD, an administrative officer acting under the sanctions of a statute subsequently held unconstitutional is liable for injuries resulting from
his acts. Judgments affirmed, two justices dissenting.
The problem of the principal case, the civil liability of an administrative officer for acts done under a statute that is subsequently declared unconstitutional, is one facet of a more basic
problem: what effect, if any, should be given an unconstitutional
statute? In the leading case of Norton v. Shelby County2 Mr. Justice
Field stated: 3 "An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates
no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though
it had never been passed." This dictum crystallized the holdings
in many earlier cases 4 and incepted the so-called absolute nullity doctrine that an unconstitutional statute is void from the date of attempted enactment. Today, courts can be divided into three general
groups as regards the weight this doctrine carries when determining
the effect of an unconstitutional statute.
'IDAHO CODE ANN. §36-1407 (1947): "[A]ny dog running at large in territory
inhabited by deer, is hereby declared a public nuisance and may be killed at such
time by any game conservation officer or other person entrusted with the enforcement of the game laws, without criminal or civil liability."
2118 U.S. 425 (1885).

31d. at 442 (dictum).

4See e.g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); Marbury v. Madison, 1 D.C. (I
Cranch) 137 (1803).
[2261
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The majority group adhere to the nullity doctrine in disregarding an unconstitutional statute.5 They impose liability upon an
administrative officer on the ground that an unconstitutional statute,
since it is void ab initio, can afford no protection to those acting
thereunder.6 Several courts in this group reinforce their holdings
with the maxim ignorantia juris non excusat.7 Thus, "every executive officer, or every person as for that matter, is presumed to know
the law - a presumption often violent but always necessary."s In
further support of this view it is contended that if ignorance of the
law were a basis for excusing the officer it would be alleged in
every case, and as a result "the administration of justice would
be arrested, and society could not exist." 9
A growing minority of courts refuse to apply the nullity doctrine,
either by rejecting it entirely or by making important exceptions.
These courts comprise the last two groups. Tennessee' ° and possibly Iowa"l are the only jurisdictions to reject the nullity doctrine
in its entirety. In Tennessee an unconstitutional statute is not
void but voidable, and an administrative officer is not liable for
acts committed under such a statute.12
In the third group the courts talk the nullity doctrine but make
important exceptions.13 This group finds its historical antecedent
in Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank. 4 In that
5E.g., Chicago, Ind. & L. Ry. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559 (1913); Propst v. Board of
Educ., 103 F. Supp. 457 (D. Neb. 1951); Morgan v. Cook, 211 Ark. 755, 202 S.W.2d
355 (1947); State ex rel. Tharel v. County Comm'rs, 188 Okla. 184, 107 P.2d 542
(1940).
6E.g., Norwood v. Goldsmith, 168 Ala. 224, 53 So. 84 (1910); Dennison Mfg. Co.
v. Wright, 156 Ga. 789, 120 S.E. 120 (1923); Waud v. Crawford, 160 Iowa 432, 141
N.W. 1041 (1913); State ex rel. Evans v. Brotherhood of Friends, 41 Wash.2d 133,
247 P.2d 787 (1952).
7See Campbell v. Sherman, 35 Wis. 103 (1874); see also Norwood v. Goldsmith,
168 Ala. 224, 53 So. 84 (1910).
SNorwood v. Goldsmith, 168 Ala. 224, 234, 53 So. 84, 87 (1910).
sCampbell v. Sherman, 35 Wis. 103, 110 (1874).
'OBricker v. Sims, 195 Tenn. 361, 259 S.W.2d 661 (1953).
"New York Life Ins. Co. v. Breen, 227 Iowa 738, 289 N.W. 16 (1939).
"2Bricker v. Sims, 195 Tenn. 361, 259 S.W.2d 661 (1953).
'sE.g., Cudahy Packing Co. v. Harrison, 18 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Ill. 1937) (suit
against collector for taxes collected under unconstitutional statute); Village of
Dolton v. Harms, 327 Ill. App. 107, 63 N.E.2d 785 (1945) (suit against municipal
treasurer misusing funds under sanction of unconstitutional statute); Golden v.
Thompson, 194 Miss. 241, 11 So.2d 906 (1943) (suit against school principal for
excluding children under unconstitutional statute).
'4308 U.S. 371 (1940).
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case the Court said that the broad statement of absolute nullity
"must be taken with qualifications [because] . . . the actual existence
of a statute . . . is an operative fact and may have consequences

which cannot justly be ignored."' 15 Some courts adopt this view
as the more realistic approach to the problem. 16 Other minority
courts argue that the majority rule is contrary to the recognized
principle that every statute is presumed to be valid until judicially
declared otherwise, that it works an injustice upon the officer, and
that it is against "public policy." 1 These courts by refusing to invoke the nullity doctrine protect a public officer when he acts in
good faith under the authority of an unconstitutional statute before it is judicially declared invalid.
In the principal case the court followed the majority view. In
an earlier case,' however, the same court refused to apply the nullity doctrine to impose criminal responsibility on an officer who
similarly had acted in good faith in reliance on the validity of an
unconstitutional statute. Thus the Idaho court has adhered to the
nullity doctrine to impose civil liability on a public officer but
has been unwilling to extend the application of the doctrine to the
field of criminal law.
The Florida Court has not as yet been confronted with the specific question of whether an administrative officer can be held
civilly liable for acts done under a statute that is subsequently declared unconstitutional. It has, however, on many occasions been
confronted with the underlying question of what effect, if any,
should be given an unconstitutional statute. Its decisions have generally followed the nullity doctrine. 19 These cases indicate that the
'51d. at 374. Plaintiff was collaterally attacking a decision of a federal district
court, which had not been appealed, on the ground that the statute on which the
decision was based had been subsequently declared unconstitutional. The question
of constitutionality was not raised at the district court hearing, and plaintiff had
been served but had not appeared. The Chicot County decision speaks in terms
of res judicata as well as nullity-it is at least questionable whether the case
in fact represents a limitation on the absolute nullity doctrine. See Jawish v. Morlet,
86 A.2d 96, 97 (D.C. Mun. App. 1952) (dictum).
'6Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 678 (1941);
J. S. Dougherty's Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 121 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1941).
"7E.g., Cudahy Packing Co. v. Harrison, 18 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Ill. 1937); Bricker
v. Sims, 195 Tenn. 361, 259 S.W.2d 661 (1953); Wichita County v. Robinson, 276
S.W.2d 509 (Tex. 1954); Shafford v. Brown, 49 Wash. 307, 95 Pac. 270 (1908).
1sState v. Garden City, 74 Idaho 513, 265 P.2d 328 (1953).
19E.g., McCormick v. Bounetheau, 139 Fla. 461, 190 So. 882 (1939); Weinberger
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Court, if confronted with the question of the principal case, would
probably follow the majority rule and impose liability on the public officer. If, however, the statute is defective as to form only,
rather than substance, the Court might protect the officer by recog20
nizing a de facto status.
Under the majority holdings the officer is best protected by refusing to act and raising the question of unconstitutionality in a
subsequent mandamus proceeding should one arise; if the statute
is a nullity, he is permitted to protect himself from liability only
by refusing to obey it.21 This result is criticized because the officer
will always hesitate before carrying out the commands of the legislative fiat.2 2 Moreover, it forces an administrative officer to determine the constitutionality of a statute before acting, or to act at his
peril.23 As to this contention, one court suggests that, if the officer
wishes to relieve himself of this burden, he can secure an indemnity
24
bond.
The minority view is the sounder because it obviates the burden
of determining constitutionality that is placed upon an administrative officer by the majority rule-a determination the legislature originally made incorrectly and one which is frequently difficult even for trained lawyers and judges to make. 25 The minority
rule, however, does nothing more than shift the burden of loss
from the- officer to the party injured by the officer's act. By preventing one injustice it creates another. Thus the majority and
minority rules represent the two extremes of the pendulum's swing,
and at either extreme someone who is hardly a wrongdoer is made
to bear the burden. Of course, the courts cannot be expected to
provide a panacea; it is beyond their power to do so. An extension
of the declaratory judgment procedure might alleviate the problem to some extent. This could be accomplished by allowing administrative officers to question the validity of mandatory statutes
which, if enforced by the officers and subsequently declared unv. Board of Pub. Instr., 93 Fla. 587, 112 So. 253 (1927); State ex rel. Nuveen v. Greer,
88 Fla. 249, 102 So. 739 (1924).
2
0See McCormick v. Bounetheau, 139 Fla. 461, 190 So. 882 (1939).
21Sumner v. Beeler, 50 Ind. 341 (1875).
22Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 P.2d 242 (1943).
23
See Norwood- v. Goldsmith, 168 Ala. 224, 53 So. 84 (1910); Campbell v.
Sherman, 35 Wis. 103 (1874).
24Campbell v. Sherman, 35 Wis. 103 (1874).
25
See Allen v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 P.2d 242 (1943).
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